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CROCKETT, Chief Justice:
Defendant Arthur Leonard Heaps was convicted by a
jury of burglary and theft, both second degree felonies,
and was sentenced on each charge to an indeterminate term of
one to fifteen years, the sentences to run concurrently. On
appeal, his contention is that he was denied the protections
the law affords him, including effective assistance of
counsel, both before and during his trial.
One of the state's witnesses, Don Allred, testified
that about 1:00 p.m. on May 22, 1978, he arrived home after
attending a funeral. He noticed two automobiles, a dark
blue Ford Mercury sedan and a white Ford Mustang, parked on
the street near the residence of his neighbor, Pat Abbott.
Mr. Allred stated that he saw two men approach the house.
One of them had fuzzy dark hair and a beard, the other was
blond haired, and both men wore Levi's and t-shirts.
A short time later, he saw the two men leave the
house carrying something In a long leather case and a television set. When they drove away, through a neighbor whose
husband is a police officer, he relayed the information to
the police. Shortly thereafter, on the basis of the description of the men and the cars Involved, police Sergeant Lynn
Turner stopped the defendant who was driving the blue Mercury
sedan. He noticed some property in the front seat and on
the floor of the vehicle, particularly a box with the barrel
of a small rifle.protruding through Its top. Officer Dennis
Davles joined Sergeant Turner, arrested the defendant and
Impounded the car. Mr. Abbott came to the impound lot and
Identified the items found in the blue sedan as being his.
Officer Davles stated that he later inspected the Abbott
residence and that the front door had been broken into.
The defendants first assertion is that a conflict
of Interest existed during pre-trial proceedings because he
and a co-defendant were both represented by attorneys from
the Legal Defender's Association. The record indicates that
at the arraignment, subsequent bond hearings and a preliminary
1. In violation of 76-6-202 and 76-6*404, U.C.A., 1953.

hearing in the circuit court, etch defendant was represented
by a different attorney from the Legal Defender1* office.
Both defendants were bound over to the district court to
stand trial. On August 99 1978. they noved to dismiss the
charges on the grounds that: (1) a witness overheard testimony of other witnesses at the preliminary hearing after the
exclusion rule had been invoked, and (2) their rights against
double Jeopardy were violated when a second preliminary
bearing was held in the circuit court without the discovery
of new or additional information
A motion to suppress
evidence on the ground that it had been illegally obtained
in a warrantless search of the two cars was also made on
behalf of each defendant.
Before the court had heard those motions, codefendant Richard Garrett pled guilty to the lesser included
offense of attempted theft and. as to him. the burglary
charge was dismissed. Concerning the defendant, the court
denied the motion to dismiss, but no suppression hearing was
held because the defendant was not present. Due to his
failure to appear for trial on August 21. 1978. a bench
warrant was issued and bail was forfeited. About three
months later, on November 9. 1978. the defendant was apprehended and brought to trial on this charge.
The Legal Defender Association, through its director,
ttoved to withdraw as counsel for the defendant, citing a
conflict of interest since it was still representing the codefendant in sentencing proceedings following his guilty
plea. The motion was granted and defendant's present counsel
was appointed to represent him at trial.
Significantly, the defendant never asked fo
ferent counsel at any time during the pre-trial proceedings
and he never registered any dissatisfaction with the performance of his counsel until after he was convicted and sentenced.
Although the defendant claims there was conflict of interest.
be does not specify what It was, other than the fact that he
was "represented in pre-trial proceedings by the Legal
Defender's Association, who also represented the untried codefendant" and that this "may require" reversal of his
conviction and a new trial*
To prevail on his claim, 11 would be necessary for
it to appear that there was a conflict of Interest which in
•ooe manner may have reacted to the defendant's detriment.
Kothlng of that character appears In this case and Done can
be presumed merely because different attorneys from the
Legal Defender's office had represented defendant.
2. State v. Kruchten, 101 Ariz. 186, 417 P.2d 510 (1966);
8tate v. Cross, 221 Kan. 98, 558 P.2d 665 (1976); State v.
Gutierrez, 116 Ariz. 207, 568 P.2d 1105 (1977)
3. See State •. Jelks, 105 Ariz. 175. 461 P.2d 473 1969).
Ko. 16264
-2-

The defendant also asserts that, at trial, his
attorney: (1) failed to attack the testimony of Mr. Allred,
who described the two men he had seen near the Abbott residence, but did not, while testifying, identify the defendant
as one of them; and (2) failed to object to the admission of
photographs depicting the property located in the front seat
and the trunk of the car the defendant was driving when he
was arrested.
Is we have heretofore stated, a defendant 16
entitled to the assistance of a competent member of the Bar,
who shows a willingness to identify himself with the interests
of the accused and present such defenses as are available
under the law and consistent with the ethics of the profession.
le have found In this record nothing to Indicate that defendant
was deprived of that entitlement*
As to (1) above, Mr. Allred gave a sufficient description of the two men and the cars they were driving that
the police were able to apprehend the defendant with the
stolen property in the car he was driving. This fact itself
seems sufficient answer to defendant's belated contention
that his counsel should have more thoroughly cross-examined
Sergeant Turner,
It for (2) above, even if an objection that the
evidence was obtained as a result of an illegal search and
seizure had been made, it would not have been well-taken.
Sergeant Turner had a sufficient description of the automobile
and of the defendant to furnish him with probable cause to
•top the car and investigate. The investigation justified
the arrest and the seizure of the stolen property which was
in plain sight*
The photographs about which complaint was made
were illustrative of material facts and no error was committed
in receiving them in evidence.
Affirmed.

Mo costs awarded.

This opinion is not regarded as adding anything
significant to existing law and hence Is not to be published
in the Utah Reporter or Pacific Reporter.
WE' CONCUR:
kichard J. Maughan, Justice

IK Frank Wilkins, Justice

Gordon R,""HaTl/"""Justice
Stewart, Justice, concurs in result.
IT Alires w. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 449 P.2d 241 (1969);
State w. McHlcol, Utah, 554 P.2d 203 (1976).
ft. See State w. Martinez, 28 Dtah 2d 80, 498 P.2d 651
(1972); State w. Coffman, Utah. 584 P.2H S ^ /i**»*
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

1

Plaintiff-Respondent, !t
V •

Case No. 890333-CA

4

JOHN E. HUMPHREY,

it

Defendant-Appellant.

Category No. 2

i

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from his conviction of Aggravated
Robbery, a first degree felony, in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

Jurisdiction

is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether defendant was afforded effective assistance

of counsel where both he and co-defendant were independently
represented by attorneys from the Salt Lake Legal Defender
Office?
2.

Whether there was sufficient evidence at trial to

support defendant's conviction for Aggravated Robbery?
3.

Whether the alleged prosecutorial misconduct did

not amount to cumulative error justifying a new trial?
4.
denied?

Whether defendant's motion for recusal was properly

5.

Whether defendant's due process rights were not

violated by the prosecution's failure to preserve photos shown to
the victim,
6.

Whether the issues raise in defendant's pro se

supplemental brief are without merit?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The full text of the constitutional provisions,
statutes, and rules are set forth in the argument and therefore
need not be restated here.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, John E. Humphrey, was charged with
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1978).

Defendant was convicted by a jury

on June 22, 1988, in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge, presiding.

Judge

Sawaya sentenced defendant to a prison term of five years to life
with a mandatory one year firearm enhancement term and a
discretionary five year firearm enhancement term, each to run
consecutively (R. 284).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At about 3J30 p.m. on October 21, 1987, defendant held
the owner of King's Custom Jewelers, Karekine Karmelian, and
Trolley Square security guard, Stephen Church, at gunpoint as he

While defendant does not raise the issue on appeal, respondent
concedes that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a
six (6) year firearm enhancement term (R. 278). Accordingly,
this Court should remand the case to the trial court with an
instruction to impose an enhancement term of five years. State
v. Willett, 694 P.2d 601 (Utah 1984).
-2-

robbed the store of jewelry, diamonds, and cash valued at
approximately $40,000 (T. 83-84, 89-90, 102, 174). During the
robbery, defendant pulled a sawed-off shotgun from a cloth bag
and directed Mr. Karmelian to empty the jewelry, diamonds, and
cash from the safe and display cases and put them in the bag (T.
84, 89-93, 121, 125-129, 150). Before leaving the jewelry store,
the robber commented that they should not try to follow him
because an accomplice was waiting outside with a gun (T. 103).
Although Mr. Karmelian and Mr. Church gave varying
descriptions of the robber, both positively identified defendant,
John E. Humphrey, as the armed robber (T. 85, 132-33, 136-37,
142, 187-188, 190, 211-12, 214). Both witnesses also identified
Exhibit #1, the shotgun subsequently seized from Charles Webb's
home, as similar to the one used in the robbery (T. 155, 189).
Britt Martindale testified that at approximately 4:00
p.m. on the same day, Webb and his girlfriend, Renee Gregersen,
backed into her driveway (T. 225-226).

Webb went into the

Martindale home, took a blanket off of Britt's waterbed, and
asked Britt to come outside with him and hold up one side of the
blanket behind the trunk of the car (T. 227-228, 273, 278). Webb
then told Gregersen to hit the trunk and when the trunk opened,
Britt saw defendant in the trunk (T. 228, 278, 279). Defendant,
who was living at the Martindale home at the time, went straight
into the bathroom and shaved off his beard (T. 229, 280).
Meanwhile, Webb retrieved from the car a canvas bag and a 12gauge sawed-off shotgun with black tape around the handle (T.
230-31). Britt later identified Exhibit #1 as the shotgun Webb
carried into her house (T. 284).

Webb and Gregersen sorted through the jewelry taken
from the bag (T. 232). Defendant walked back and forth between
the bathroom and the kitchen while shaving and explaining "how he
put the shotgun in some guy's face" and handcuffed a guard who
arrived during the robbery (T. 237). Webb exclaimed that
"everything went great," that "the cops didn't show up" for a
while, and that he knew everything was okay when "all he saw was
an old man coming over a fence."

(T. 237.)

Later that day,

defendant, Webb, and Britt's husband, Russell Martindale, left
for Las Vegas (T. 241).
Britt testified she knew Russell had stolen a car, but
denied knowing it was to be used to facilitate the robbery (T.
252).

Russell was granted immunity for stealing the car in

return for his testimony (T. 402-3).

He testified that Webb told

him he would pay the rent on Russell's house if he would steal a
car for him (T. 408). Webb also told Russell that he knew
someone in Las Vegas that could get rid of the items that he and
defendant had stolen (T. 405).
On November 2, 1987, the police received a tip that
Britt Martindale had information concerning the King's robbery
(T. 295-96, 330). Based on a statement Britt gave to Detective
Harvey Jackson of the Salt Lake City Police Department on
November 3, 1987, the police obtained an arrest warrant for
defendant, Webb, and Gregersen (T. 330, 334-6, 650).
When the police entered the Webb/Greggersen home,
defendant was arrested in one of the bedrooms and Webb was
arrested in another bedroom with a sawed-off shotgun under the

bed (R. 669, 675). Gregersen's purse was searched for weapons
incident to her arrest and a diamond watch was found which she
later told police came from the King's robbery (T. 671).
Gregersen consented to a search of her property for weapons and
jewelry (T. 653, 669-70, 674). Among other items, the police
took into evidence a diamond and sapphire ring (T. 655). Mr.
Karmillian testified that both the diamond watch and the diamond
and sapphire ring were among those items stolen from his store
(T. 111). Britt testified that the seized watch was the same
watch Webb gave Gregerson at her house following the robbery (T.
232).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant was not denied effective assistance of
counsel due to a conflict of interest.

Defendant has not

established that an actual conflict of interest existed between
defendant's counsel and co-defendant's counsel, both of whom were
members of the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association.

Where no

actual conflict is shown, no prejudicial error can be presumed.
The evidence was sufficient to support defendant's
conviction for Aggravated Robbery.

Defendant was identified by

two eyewitnesses as the robber.
Because no substantial prosecutorial misconduct
occurred, defendant is not entitled to a new trial on the theory
of cumulative error.
Defendant's motion for recusal was unsupported by any
evidence of bias and therefore its dismissal was not prejudicial
error.

-5-

Defendant's due process rights were not violated when a
photo array shown to a witness was not preserved for trial. The
photo array was not preserved because the witness could not
positively identify defendant's photo.

However, the witness

positively identified defendant at trial.

In light of the

positive identification at trial, it was not prejudicial error to
fail to preserve an inconclusive photo array.
The claims raised in defendant's pro se supplemental
brief should be rejected.

The many issues raised are unpreserved

for appeal, lacking for legal or factual support, or clearly
meritless.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE THE CONFLICT OF
INTEREST ISSUE, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
DEFENDANT FAILS TO ESTABLISH THAT AN ACTUAL
CONFLICT OF INTEREST EXISTED AND THAT
PREJUDICE OCCURRED.
A.

Defendant Failed To Raise The Conflict of
Interest Issue In The Trial Court Below.

Defendant infers in his brief that he has preserved for
review the conflict of interest issue arising between his
attorney and co-defendant Webb's attorney, both appointed from
the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association.

(Brief of App. at 13*)

However, a review of the record reveals that defendant failed to
raise the issue in the trial court below.
It is well-established that this Court will not
consider an issue on appeal which was not raised in the trial
court and preserved for appeal.

Floyd v. Western Surgical

Associates, Inc., 773 P.2d 401 (Utah App. 1989); State v.

Steqqellf 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983).

A defendant must afford the

trial court an opportunity to correct any error at the trial
level-

See State v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 599 (Utah 1988).
On appeal, defendant cites to three points in the

record in support of his claim:

(1) Webb's Motion to Sever his

trial from defendant's; (2) defendant's pro se Motion for
Conflict of Interest and Trial Separation; and, (3) Webb's Motion
for a New Trial (R. 81, 98, 287-88).

However, a review of these

record citations reveals that no conflict of interest issue
between attorneys from the Legal Defender Office was timely
raised by defendant.
Defendant's pro se Motion for Conflict of Interest
states that a conflict existed because Webb would be deprived of
a fair trial where more evidence would be introduced against
defendant than Webb (R. 98). Prior to trial, Judge Sawaya heard
defendant and Webb's motions to sever co-defendant Gregersen due
to her incriminating statements to the police (T. 640-45).

At

this time, defendant's counsel specifically stated that she had
no objection to defendant and Webb being tried together (T. 644).
Although defendant filed several pro se motions in the trial
court alleging a conflict of interest, they address only
defendant's conflict of interest with his attorney, or the trial
judge, and do not raise a conflict of interest between the
attorneys from the Legal Defender Office (R. 109-15, 123, 271).
Defendant further claims he made repeated requests for
severance from Webb and cites the record where he claims he
raised the conflict of interest issue between the Legal Defender

Attorneys.

(Brief of App. at 14).

Contrary to defendant's

claim, the record cite does not refer to defendant raising the
conflict issue, but to Webb's post-trial letter to his own
counsel raising the issue (R. 287-88).

Defendant fails to cite

to the record where his claimed repeated requests for severance
can be found or where he, not Webb, raised the issue of a
conflict of interest between the legal defenders.
Additionally, at defendant's hearing on his Motion for
New Trial, defendant's counsel referred to a pro se motion by
defendant which raised several issues (T. 745). However, this
pro se motion cannot be found in the record.

Defendant's counsel

summarized defendant's allegations in the motion which included a
conflict of interest with his attorney who he believed as Min
collusion with the [prosecution] in altering the police reports
and tapes of the preliminary hearing and . . . only pointed out
some of the inconsistencies in the Martindale testimony rather
than all of them" (T. 747). Defendant did not claim a conflict
of interest issue between the Legal Defender attorneys.

Because

defendant failed to raise the conflict issue at any time below,
he cannot now claim error for the first time on appeal.

State v.

Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983).
B.

Defendant Was Not Denied Effective
Assistance Of Counsel Due To An
Alleged Conflict Of Interest.
1.

Federal Constitutional Analysis.

Defendant argues that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel under the Utah and federal constitutions
due to a conflict of interest affecting his trial attorney's

performance.

He claims that an inherent conflict existed because

his counsel and co-defendant's counsel were both from the Salt
Lake Legal Defender Association.
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed its
adherence to the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance
of counsel.

State v. Carterf 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 15 (S. Ct.

5/12/89); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

In

order to prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, a defendant "must
show, first, that his or her counsel rendered a deficient
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment,
and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the
defendant."

Carter, 108 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15, citing,

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.
The Strickland court held that the appropriate test for
prejudice is that M[t]he defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome."

Strickland, 446 U.S. at 695. See

also, State v. Carter, 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 15 (S. Ct.
5/12/89).

Failure to show either deficient performance or

resulting prejudice will defeat a claim of ineffective counsel.
State v, Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985).
Applying the ineffective assistance of counsel test to
a claim of conflict of interest, the United States Supreme Court
uses two different approaches depending on the procedural

setting.

The first is used when a potential conflict is brought

to the attention of the court before trial.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978).

Holloway v.

Once notified, the court must

take adequate steps to remedy the problem so that the defendant
is not deprived of effective assistance of counsel.

People v.

Jones, 121 111.2d 21, 111 111.Dec. 164, 520 N.E.2d 325, 329
(1988), citing, Holloway, 435 U.S. 475.
The second approach is employed when a conflict is not
alleged until after trial and requires the defendant to show that
an actual conflict of interest existed at trial that adversely
affected his counsel's performance.
335, 349 (1980).

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.

A defendant "bears the burden of establishing

the inadequacy or ineffectiveness of counsel, and proof of such
must be a demonstrable reality and not a speculative matter."
State v. McNicholf 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976).
In the present case, defendant did not raise a conflict
of interest claim between his counsel and co-defendant's counsel
at any time.

Defendant improperly infers in his brief that

Webb's pre-trial Motion to Sever, which was made by Webb's
privately retained counsel, should have alerted the court to an
inherent conflict of interest (R. 82). (Br. of App. at 13-14.)
However, the motion merely states that Webb believed that
substantially more evidence would be introduced against defendant
than himself and that he would be prejudiced in the eyes of the
jury due to guilt by association (R. 82).
Likewise, defendant Humphrey's pro se Motion for
Conflict of Interest and Trial Separation argues that Webb will

be deprived of a fair trial because more evidence would be
introduced against defendant than Webb (R. 98). It further
appears that the alleged conflict of interest claim raised in the
Motion between defendant and his attorney, not between the
attorneys from the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (R. 10915, 123, 271; T. 12).
In his brief, defendant concedes that he was not
entitled to a severance as a matter of right and does not raise
the issue on appeal.

(Br. of App. at 14). In fact, defendant

specifically waived an opportunity to pursue a severance of
defendant and Webb (T. 644). Rather, defendant claims that
because of the joint representation by Legal Defenders, he was
precluded from pursuing a defense on the theory that Webb was the
guilty party and that he was simply being drawn into the crime
through suggestive photo displays.

(Br. of App. at 14).

Defendant speculates that had his attorney pursued an
antagonistic defense rather than a defense based on mutually
corroborating claims of innocence, the result would likely have
been different.

(Br. of App. at 19.)

The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the issue of whether a
legal defender association may represent co-defendants with an
alleged conflict of interest in State v. Heaps, slip op. No.
16264 (S. Ct. filed October 31, 1979) (unpublished). (See
Addendum "A"; Opinion.).

Heaps rejected the defendant's claim

that he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to his codefendant being represented by the same legal defender
association.

The Court ruled:

Significantly, the defendant never asked
for different counsel at any time during the
pre-trial proceedings and he never registered
any dissatisfaction with the performance of
his counsel until after he was convicted and
sentenced. Although the defendant claims
there was conflict of interest, he does not
specify what it was, other than the fact that
he was "represented in pre-trial proceedings
by the Legal Defender's Association, who also
represented the untried co-defendant" and
that this Mmay require" reversal of his
conviction and a new trial.
To prevail on his claim, it would be
necessary for it to appear that there was a
conflict of interest which in some manner may
have reacted to the defendant's detriment.
Nothing of that character appears in this
case and none can be presumed merely because
different attorneys from the Legal Defender's
Office had represented defendant.
Slip op. at page 2.

Thus, the court held that a legal defender

association is not per se prohibited from representing codefendants whose interests may be in conflict and an appellant
must show an actual detrimental conflict existed in the record.
Id.

Accord State v. Jelks# 105 Ariz. 175, 461 P.2d 473 (1969);

State v. Gutierrez, 116 Ariz. 207, 568 P.2d 1105 (Ariz. App.
1977); and State v. Gross, 221 Kan. 98, 558 P.2d 665 (1976).
In State v. Barella, 714 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986) the Utah
Supreme Court again addressed the issue of whether a conflict
existed where the Legal Defender's Office represented codefendants.

The court held that the defendant was not denied

effective assistance of counsel where the claim of conflict was
merely speculative.

Barella, 714 P.2d at 288-89, citing State v.

Jelks, 105 Ariz. 175, 461 P.2d 473 (1969); and United States v.
Lugo, 350 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1965).

Similarly, in Batchelor v. Smith, 555 P.2d 871 (Utah
1976), the Utah Supreme Court held that there "is no just reason
to accuse an attorney of incompetence simply because she may be
the spouse of another attorney who is in the case; and this is
especially true where both attorneys are striving to thwart the
efforts of the prosecuting attorney."
872.

Batchelor, 555 P.2d at

The court opined that the seeds of ineffectiveness of

counsel claims "have often fallen in fertile judicial soil. It
seems to be the last refuge of those who make no claim of
innocence but have a burning yen to escape from the penalties
provided by law for their criminal conduct."

Batchelor, 555 P.2d

at 871-72.
Defendant relies on several authorities holding that an
actual conflict of interest exists when co-defendants are jointly
represented.

However, many of these cases are factually

distinguishable in that a single attorney represented more than
2
one defendant with conflicting interests.

In contrast to

defendant's claim, a number of courts have held that two
attorneys appointed from a Legal Defender's Association may
individually represent co-defendants in the same trial where no
3
conflict of interest is shown.
2
Defendant cites the following: Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S.
475 (1978); State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697 (Utah 1980); State v.
Robinson, 662 P.2d 1341 (N.Mex. 1983); United States v .
Martinez, 630 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1980); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446
U.S. 335 (5th Cir. 1980); State v. Thompson, 108 Ariz. 500, 502
P.2d 1319 (1972).
3
See State v. Rogers, 177 N.J.Super. 365, 426 A.2d 1035 (1981);
Hernandez v. Mondragon, 824 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1987); Richardson
v. State, 439 N.E.2d 610 (Ind. 1982); Averhart v. State, 470
N.E.2d 666 (Ind. 1984); People v. Dallas, 40 111. Dec. 110, 85

Here, while both defense counsel were associated with
the same Legal Defender Office, both defendant and Webb were
represented by separate, competent, conflict-free counsel. As
defendant notes in his brief, "what was presented to the jury was
a united front where both defendants would succeed or fail
together."

(Br. of App. at 20.)

This defense approach was

simply a matter of trial strategy and was not objected to by
defendant until after the jury's verdict of guilty.

The record

clearly shows that defendant's counsel enthusiastically advocated
4
his cause in making numerous objections and motions.
It cannot
be said that a "diminution in the zeal of representation" of
defendant occurred from the joint representation of co-defendants
by the same law association.

(Br. of App. at 20.)

Both attorneys gave individual opening and closing
arguments for their respective defendants (T. 71-82, 585-612).

Cont. App.3d 153, 405 N.E.2d 1202 (111. App. Ct. 1980); State
v. Bell, 90 N.J. 163, 447 A.2d 525 (1982); State v. Robinson, 99
N.M. 674, 662 P.2d 1341 (1983); Osborn v. Schillinger, 639 F.Supp
610 (D. Wyo. 1986), order affirmed by 861 F.2d 612 (10th Cir.
1988); Davis v. Franzen, 671 F.2d 1056 (7th Cir. 1982). But see
Rodriguez v. State, 129 Ariz. 67, 628 P.2d 950 (1981).
4
Defendant's appointed counsel from the Legal Defender's Office
made the following motions to the court; Motion for Discovery
(R. 31, 41, T. 632); Motion to Sever from Gregersen (R. 55, T.
640-47); Motion in Limine to Suppress Defendant's Prior
Convictions (R. 72); Motion to Suppress Identification (R. 74);
Motion for New Trial (R. 289, T. 745-8); Motion to Dismiss (T.
425 and T. 323); Motion for Mistrial (T. 426, 540 and 623);
Defense Counsel also joined in the Motion to Dismiss made at
trial by co-defendnt's counsel (T. 323). Counsel also made
rigorous objections at trial on behalf of defendant (T. 186, 380,
426, 453, 478, 500, 557, 564, 623, 625) and gave vigorous crossexamination to the State's witnesses (T. 117, 175, 193, 219, 275,
307, 328, 332, 351). Counsel also called several defense
witnesses (T. 353, 366, 369, 432).
_n A _

Webb's counsel stated clearly in opening argument that she was
independant of defendant's counsel in her representation of Webb
and stressed that the jury must view them individually (T. 7778).

In closing argument, Webb's counsel again reiterated to

the jury that although there is some "overlap in certain
instances in terms of defending our respective defendants, the
cases against them are separate and they must be looked at by you
in that same type of fashion.H (T. 603).
An examination of the instant record reveals that no
conflict of interest existed between the defendant and codefendant.

Defendant was positively identified by two persons at

King's Custom Jewelers as the person who held up the jewelry
store (T. 85, 142, 287-88); two other witnesses testified that
both defendant and Webb were responsible for the aggravated
robbery (T. 85, 142, 187-88); both defendant and Webb were
arrested together and charged with the crime (T. 665-66); some of
the stolen articles were found in their possession as well as a
gun identified by witnesses as similar to that used in the
robbery (T. Ill, 155, 189, 669, 671); and both defendants took
the stand and corroborated the other's testimony that they had
been set up (T. 432-492, 503-538).
Defense counsel's trial strategy cannot be used to
determine whether she was effective or whether the alleged
conflict between defendant and co-defendant was prejudicial.

In

State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981), cert, denied, 459 U.S.
988 (1981) the Utah Supreme Court held the "[t]rial tactics lie
within the prerogative of counsel and may not be dictated by his

client.

Decisions as to what witnesses to call, what objections

to make, and, by and large, what defenses to interpose are
generally left to the professional judgment of counsel."

Wood,

648 P.2d at 91. As Justice Frankfurter noted in Glasser#
"'[jjoint representation is a means of insuring against
reciprocal recrimination.

A common defense often gives strength

against a common attack.'"

Halloway v. Arkansasf 435 U.S. 475,

482-83 (1978)), quoting, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,
92 (1942).

It is generally accepted that "[sjtrategic decisions

are not the kind which the courts permit convicted felons to
indulge in second guessing."
P.2d 1118, 1120 (1975).

State v. Huizar, 112 Ariz. 489, 543

Here, defendant has failed to show "how

counsel's decisions were not merely tactical choices or how [her]
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable
judgment." State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1989).

In

State v. Barella, 714 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme
court cited with approval the language in United States v. Lugo,
350 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1965) where the court stated:
[W]hile we cannot indulge in nice
calculations about the amount of prejudice
which results from a conflict of interest . . .
neither can we create a conflict of interest out
of mere conjecture as to what might have been
shown."
Barella, 714 P.2d at 289, quoting, Lugo, 350 F.2d at 859.
Defendant has also failed to show how a conflict, if it
existed, operated to his detriment at trial other than to
speculate how independent counsel would have conducted his
defense.

(See Br. of App. at 19-20.)

In the absence of a

showing of prejudice, an ineffective assistance claim must fail.
Geary, 707 P.2d at 646.

2.

State Constitutional Analysis

Defendant argues that an accused should be granted more
rights under the Utah Constitution than the federal constitution.
He urges this Court to adopt a rule that an inquiry be mandated
at the trial level in all cases of multiple representation by the
same law association, and that remedial measures such as
severance/ appointment of independent counsel, or waiver be
required if a potential conflict appears.

(Br. of App. at 21.)

As recognized by defendant, Utah has adopted the
universally accepted federal Strickland standard in reviewing
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
747 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah 1987).

State v. Archuleta,

Further, defendant concedes

that the Utah and federal provisions are textually identical and
that the Utah Supreme Court has expressly rejected any
modification of the federal Strickland standard.
770 P.2d 116, 118-19 n.2 (Utah 1989).

State v. Verde,

(Br. of App. at 8-9).

Defendant merely complains that the failure of the Utah courts to
consider the parameters of the state guarantee "has created case
law which simply 'march[es] lock-step with interpretation given
to . . . the United States Constitution.'"

(Br. of App. at 9.)

(quoting State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 272 (Utah 1986) (Durham,
J., concurring)).
The State concedes that this Court may continue to
follow the federal minimum guarantees or may extend further state
protections.

See State v. Earl# 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986); State

v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985).

However,

because defendant failed to raise the conflict of interest issue

in the trial court below, much less articulate state
constitutional grounds as a basis for his claim, this Court
should not consider defendant's state constitutional claim on
appeal.

State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct. App.

1989).
In any event, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that
their reasoning in evaluating ineffective assistance claims is
consistent with Strickland.
1984).

State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah

Further, the Utah Supreme Court has refused to modify the

Strickland test.

State v. Verde, 770 P.2d at 118-19 n.2.

Accordingly, if this Court is inclined to specify separate state
constitutional standards in evaluating effective assistance of
counsel, respondent submits that the Strickland test has been
adopted by the Utah courts as a workable standard.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION.
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence
presented at trial to support his conviction.

A review of the

evidence, however, reveals that defendant's claim is without
merit.
The Utah Supreme Court pointed out in State v. Booker,
709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985), that where a defendant claims the
evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, the standard
of review is narrow.
[W]e review the evidence and all
inferences which may reasonably be drawn
from it in the light most favorable to
the verdict of the jury. We reverse a
jury conviction for insufficient
-18-

evidence only when the evidence, so
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant commited the
crime of which he was convicted.
State v. Petree, Utah, 659, P.2d 443, 444
(1983); accord State v. McCardell, Utah, 652
P.2d 942, 945 (1982). In reviewing the
conviction, we do not substitute our judgment
for that of the jury. "It is the exclusive
function of the jury to weigh the evidence
and to determine the credibility of the
witnesses. . . H State v. Lamm, Utah, 606
P.2d 229, 231 (1980); accord State v. Linden,
Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 1366 (1983). So long as
there is some evidence, including reasonable
inferences, from which findings of all the
requisite elements of the crime can
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops. . . .
Id. at 345.
Defendant was convicted of the offense of Aggravated
Robbery which provides as follows:
Aggravated robbery. —
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery
if in the course of committing robbery he:
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife
or a deadly weapon; or
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon
another.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the
first degree.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act
shall be deemed to be "in the course of
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an
attempt to commit, during the commission of,
or in the immediate flight after the attempt
or commission of a robbery.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1978).

Thus, the elements of

Aggravated Robbery applicable to this case are that the
prosecution establish that defendant:

(1) used a firearm or a

facsimile of a firearm, (2) in an attempt to commit, during the
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or
commission of a robbery.
4 ft

A review of the evidence offered at trial establishes
each and every element of the offense.

The record shows that on

October 21, 1987 an armed man held the owner of King's Custom
Jewelers, Karekine Karmelian, and Trolley Square security guard,
Stephen Church, at gunpoint as he robbed the store of jewelry,
diamonds, and cash, valued at $40,000 to $42,000 (T. 83-84, 8990, 102, 174). During the robbery, the man pulled a sawed-off
shotgun from a cloth bag and directed Mr. Karmelian to empty the
jewelry, diamonds, and cash from the safe and display cases and
put them in the bag (T. 84, 89-93, 121, 125-129, 150). The
robber also directed the security guard to handcuff himself to
Mr. Karmilian and give the robber the handcuff key (T. 131-32,
184-85, 187, 199, 202). Before leaving the jewelry store, the
robber commented that they should not try to follow him because
an accomplice was waiting outside with a gun (T. 103).
Although Mr. Karmelian and Mr. Church gave varying
descriptions of the robber, both positively identified defendant,
John E. Humphrey, as the armed robber (T. 85, 132-33, 136-37,
142, 187-188, 190, 211-12, 214). Both witnesses also identified
Exhibit #1, the shotgun subsequently seized from Charles Webb's
home, as similar to the one used in the robbery (T. 155, 189).
Russell Martindale testified that Webb promised to pay
his rent if Russell would steal a car for him (T. 408). After
making arrangements with Russell regarding how to steal the car
and where to take it, defendant drove Russell to a car lot to
steal the car (T. 408-10).

Using the pretense of taking the car

for a test drive, Russell took the car to a McDonald's parking

lot and gave the keys to Webb (T. 409-10).

The stolen car was

used in the robbery the next day and was found by police three
weeks later abandoned in a parking lot (T. 334, 347, 381, 393).
A hat and coat found inside the car matched the description of
the clothing worn by the robber (T. 344-45, 376-77).
Britt Martindale testified that Webb and Renee
Gregersen arrived at her house about a half an hour after the
robbery and backed Webb's Cadillac into her driveway (T. 225-26).
Webb took a blanket off of Britt's waterbed and instructed her to
follow him outside and hold up one end of the blanket behind the
trunk of the car (T. 227-28, 273, 278). When Gregersen opened
the trunk, Britt saw defendant in the trunk (T. 228, 278-79).
Defendant, who was living with the Martindale'8 at the time,
climbed out of the trunk and went immediately into the bathroom
to shave off his beard (T. 229, 279-80, 435, 443-44).

Webb

carried a canvas bag and a 12-gauge sawed-off shotgun into the
Martindale home (T. 230-31).

Britt identified Exhibit #1 as the

shotgun Webb took into her house (T. 284).
Britt watched Webb and Gregersen sort through the
jewelry taken from the bag (T. 232, 236). She observed a diamond
watch, diamonds folded up in paper, colored stones, U.S. coins,
currency, and Canadian money (T. 232-34).

Britt also noticed a

Trolley Square insignia on the inside of some of the boxes (T.
272-274).

Webb asked defendant if Gregersen could keep the

diamond watch, to which defendant agreed (T. 233). Webb
commented that everything had gone well and that the police did
not show up for a while (T. 237). Defendant walked back and

forth between the bathroom and the kitchen while shaving and
explaining "how he put the shotgun in some guy's faceH and
handcuffed a guard who arrived during the robbery (T. 237, 41415).
When Russell Martindale arrived, Webb, Gregersen, and a
clean shaven defendant left with the money, jewelry, and stones
in a small brown paper bag (T. 236, 239, 264, 400). Webb told
Britt not to "mess" with the bag used in the robbery until he
came back to get it (T. 239). Webb returned a couple hours later
and said he was going to put the bag in the river (T. 240).
Defendant and Webb returned around 11$30 p.m., picked up Russell
and the shotgun, and left for Las Vegas (T. 241, 405). Webb said
he knew someone in Las Vegas who would be able to get rid of the
items he and defendant had stolen (T. 405).
After arriving in Las Vegas, Webb admittedly pawned
some diamonds (T. 386, 526, 534). At one pawn shop, Webb took a
ring to the window and asked Russell for his driver's license (T.
387).

At trial, Russell admitted signing the pawn slip but

testified he did not know what he was signing at the time (T.
387).

Russell also testified that defendant and Webb left him

alone several times for hours (T. 405). Russell travelled with
defendant and Webb approximately 3-4 days until they parted
company in Portland (T. 411).
Based upon information from Britt Martindale, the
police obtained arrest warrants for the defendant, Webb, and
Gregersen (T. 334-36, 650). When the police went to the
Webb/Gregersen home to make the arrests, defendant was found in

one of the bedrooms and Webb was found in another bedroom with a
sawed-off shotgun under the bed (T. 669, 675). Gregersen's purse
was searched for weapons incident to her arrest and a diamond
watch was found in her purse which she later told police came
from the King's robbery (T. 671). Gregersen consented to a
search of her property for weapons and jewelry (T. 653, 669-70,
674).

Among other items, the police took into evidence a diamond

and sapphire ring (T. 655). Mr. Karmillian testified that both
the diamond watch and the diamond and sapphire ring were among
those items stolen from his store (T. 111). Britt Martindale
also testified that Webb gave Gregerson the watch following the
robbery (T. 232).
Based upon the evidence, a jury could have reasonably
concluded that defendant used a sawed-off shotgun in committing a
robbery at King's Custom Jewelers.

The evidence was more than

sufficient to establish the requisite elements of the offense.
Defendant appears to further argue that the evidence
was insufficient because some evidence, if believed, tends to
show that defendant did not commit the offense.

In making his

argument, defendant ignores the fundamental principle that a
jury's belief or disbelief of a defendant'6 theory of a crime is
a matter within the jury's exclusive prerogative to weigh the
credibility of the witness' testimony.

State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d

229 (Utah 1980); Efco Distributing, Inc., v. Perrinf 17 Utah 2d
375, 412 P.2d 615 (Utah 1966).

The basic function of the jury is

to weigh the conflicting evidence and draw conclusions therefrom.
State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780 (Utah 1986).

Despite testimony to

the contrary, the jury could have found, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that defendant committed the offenses of which he was
convicted.

State v. Petreef 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983).
POINT III
NO CUMULATIVE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
OCCURRED WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY A NEW TRIAL.
Defendant argues that the cumulative effect of alleged

improper prosecutorial remarks warrants a new trial.

Defendant's

claim is frivolous.
It is well-established that a defendant must show some
degree of demonstrable prejudice in order to successfully argue
error based on prosecutorial misconduct.

State v. Lafferty, 749

P.2d 1239, 1255 (Utah 1988), On Reconsideration, 109 Utah Adv.
Rep. 21 (5/30/89).

The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a two-part

test for determining whether a prosecutor's remark warrants
reversal; "(1) did the remarks call to the attention of the
jurors matters which they could not propely consider in
determining their verdict, and (2) were the jurors under the
circumstances of the particular case probably influenced by those
remarks."

State v. Tucker, 727 P.2d 185, 187 (Utah 1986).

Under

Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedures, H[a]ny error,
defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded."

This Court

should not reverse a conviction unless the error "is something
substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there is a
reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have been a
different result."

State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 316 (Utah

1985), quoting State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326, 1329 (Utah 1980).

Further, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that
"'[c]ounsel for both sides have considerable latitude in their
[closing] arguments to the jury; they have a right to discuss
fully from their stand points the evidence and the inferences and
deductions arising therefrom.'"

State v. Lafferty# 749 P.2d at

1255, quoting State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 60, 513 P.2d 422,
426 (1973).

Any improper comment may be effectively cured by the

trial court's admonishment to the jury to disregard the improper
statement.

See State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1982);

State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987).

Additionally, a

curative jury instruction is generally sufficient to obviate any
harm from an improper comment by the prosecutor.

State v. Hales#

652 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1982); State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573,
(Utah 1983).
The concept of H'[cjumulative error refers to a number
of errors which prejudice [a] defendant's rights to a fair
trial."1

Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1988) (quoting

State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987); State v. Rammel, 721
P.2d 498, 501-02 (Utah 1986)).

Where no substantial errors were

committed, the concept of cumulative error does not apply.

Bundy

v. DeLand, 763 P.2d at 806; State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 38
(Utah 1989).
Additionally, an appellant must indicate from the
record that he made a proper objection below.
714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 1986).

State v. Barella,

Failure to refer to pages in the

record to support points on appeal will normally require the
Court to assume regularity in the proceedings and correctness of

the judgment appealed from.

State v. 01mos# 712 P.2d 27 (Utah

1986).
Defendant alleges several instances of prosecutorial
misconduct, yet fails to cite to his objections in the record.
(Br. of App. at 27.)

Defendant failed to object to the

prosecutor's reference in closing argument to a police stop of
defendant and Webb in the State of Oregon (T. 617). Defendant
also failed to join in Webb's objections to the cross-examination
of defendant regarding the police stop (T. 488-90).

He failed to

object to the prosecutor allegedly eliciting tesitmony that Webb
used an alias (T. 327). Because defendant failed to object
below, this Court should find that he has not preserved these
issues for appeal.

Olmos, 712 P.2d at 287.

Turning to the defendant's allegations of misconduct to
which he did object, it is clear that no substantial error
occurred.

Defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly

elicited testimony that connected defendant and Webb to other
crimes.

He points to the prosecutor's direct examination of

Detective Lomax which occurred as follows:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:

A:

You made marks on the one figure that's
labeled "bed". That's where you say you
found the shotgun?
Partially protruding.
And the other mark appears on the item
that is labeled—
Dresser. As I Recall, it was in a
jewelry case there.
Okay, thank you. You may return to your
seat. Did you receive any instructions
about what you were looking for with
regards to the jewlery box?
Well, obviously, we were looking for the
shotgun. I received a phone call from
Detective Dalling indicating that there
were a couple of rings in the jewelry box

that he had been told by Reneee that were
given to her by either Webb or Humphrey.
MS. WELLS: Objection.
MR. COPE: Not offered to prove the matter
asserted, merely to show why he
was looking in the jewelry box.
THE COURT: In any event, I think it is
prejudicial and should be
stricken. I will admonish the
jury to discard that answer.
(T. 304-05; Webb's objection T. 305, 323-24; joined by defendant
T. 324). While Webb's counsel did not state a specific ground
for her objection, it appears that she was complaining of the
hearsay statements of Renee Gregersen to the police that jewelry
could be found in her jewelry box.

Id.

Webb's objection was

sustained and the jury admonished to disregard the response.

Id.

Judge Sawaya later denied Webb's Motion for New Trial finding
that the comment was "not that prejudicial" and that it did not
warrant a curative instruction.

In view of the minimal prejudice

that could be inferred from the comment and the judge's quick
response in admonishing the jury to disregard the comment, no
substantial error occurred.
Finally, defendant claims that the prosecutor
inappropriately inferred in closing argument that defendant
refused to be in a line-up.

In response to defendant's counsel's

comment in closing argument that no line-up was conducted, the
prosecutor commented as follows:
Have a good look at that composite sketch
that was introduced by the defense and
compare it with the 1986 photograph
authenticated by Mr. Humphrey himself about
what he looked like with a beard on, an
incredibly good likeness, I would say. No
line-up. There was no line-up. Oh, my
goodness, we can't have a line-up if the
defendant doesn't want to participate in one.

And if we have one or if we showed some
pictures, then the defense is going to say we
suggested to these people what they were
supposed to say, so we are in no position—
Yes# there was no line-up, but why do we need
a line-up when you have the people, when you
have the eyewitnesses saying yes, that's who
it was, when you have a third party saying
these people participated in a robbery that
my husband helped to stage.
(T. 615.)

Later, defendant's counsel, joined by Webb's counsel,

moved for a mistrial arguing that the prosecutor's comment
implied that defendant refused to participate in a line-up and
thus violated defendant's right to remain silent (T. 623). The
prosecutor responded that the issue was fairly raised in
defendant's closing argument where he complained that no line-up
was conducted.

JId. He explained that he was merely pointing out

that the State would be criticized if it conducted a line-up and
criticized if it did not.

Jd.

Judge Sawaya denied the motion.

Defendant's claim should be rejected where the comment was fairly
in response to defendant's closing arument, was a fair comment on
the evidence, and caused no perceivable prejudice to defendant.
It must be noted that the trial judge submitted several
instructions to the jury which would have a curative effect on
the claimed errors of defendant.

The trial court instructed the

jury not to consider evidence offered but not admitted, evidence
stricken by the court, or any question to which an objection wai
sustained (T. 233; Jury Instruction No. 6). The jury was also
instructed to not conjecture as to what an answer might have been
or the reason for an objection.

Ijd. The jury was told to "not

consider as evidence any statment of counsel made during trial,
unless such statement was made as an admission or stipulation
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conceding the existence of a fact or facts" (R. 235; Jury
Instruction No. 8). (See also Jury Instruction No. 12; R. 239.)
As noted earlier# a curative jury instruction is
generally sufficient to obviate any harm from an improper comment
by a witness or counsel.
(Utah 1982).

State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1292

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, this

Court "must assume that the jurors were conscientious in
performing to their duty, and that they followed the instructions
of the court."

State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322,

1324 (1974); State v. White, 577 P.2d 552, 555 (Utah 1978).
In sum, defendant claims that he is entitled to a new
trial on the basis of cumulative error arising from independent
instances of prosecutorial misconduct.

Based on the foregoing

discussion of defendant's allegations of error, a new trial is
not warranted on the basis of any individual error or on a theory
of cumulative error.

Contrary to defendant's claim, the evidence

of defendant's guilt was strong and was based on evidence of his
direct involvement in the planning, execution, and flight from
the robbery.

Because no substantial errors occurred, the concept

of cumulative error is inapplicable.

State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d

29, 38 (Utah 1989).
POINT IV
JUDGE WILKINSON PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE SAWAYA.
Defendant claims that his pro se affidavit to recuse
the Judge Sawaya was sufficient to raise "at least [the]
appearance of bias" and that the trial judge's refusal to recuse
himself resulted in actual prejudice to defendant.

(Br. of App.

at 29.)

In support of his argument, defendant cites the

allegations made in his affidavit but fails to support them with
record evidence.

(Br. of App. at 29.)

Because defendant fails

to refer to pages in the record to support points on appeal, this
Court should assume regularity in the proceedings below.

State

v. 01mos# 712 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986).
In any event, Judge Wilkinson properly denied
defendant's motion to recuse Judge Sawaya.

Utah Code Ann. § 7 7 -

35-29(c) and (d) (Supp. 1989) sets forth the procedure to be
followed when an affidavit has been filed to disqualify a judge:
(c) If the prosecution or a defendant in
any criminal action or proceeding files an
affidavit that the judge before whom the
action or proceeding is to be tried or heard
has a bias or prejudice, either against the
party or his attorney or in favor of any
opposing party to the suit, the judge shall
proceed no further until the challenge is
disposed of. Every affidavit shall state the
facts and the reasons for the belief that the
bias or prejudice exists and shall be filed
as soon as practicable after the case has
been assigned or the bias or prejudice is
known. No affidavit may be filed unless
accompanied by a certificate of counsel of
record that the affidavit and application are
made in good faith.
(d) If the challenged judge questions the
sufficiency of the allegation of disqualification, he shall enter an order directing
that a copy be forthwith certified to another
named judge of the same court or of a court
of like jurisdiction, which judge shall then
pass upon the legal sufficiency of the
allegations. If the challenged judge does
not question the legal sufficiency of the
affidavit, or if the judge to whom the
affidavit is certified finds that it is
legally sufficient, another judge shall be
called to try the case or to conduct the
proceeding. If the judge to whom the
affidavit is certified does not find the
affidavit to be legally sufficient, he shall

enter a finding to that effect and the
challenged judge shall proceed with the case
or proceeding.
(emphasis added.).

Applying the recusal statute, the Utah

Supreme Court recently held that!
while, we recommend the practice that a judge
recuse himself where there is a colorable
claim of bias or prejudice, absent a showing
of actual bias or an abuse of discretion,
failure to do so does not constitute
reversible error as long as the requirements
of section 77-35-29 are met.
State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 1094-95 (Utah), cert, denied, 108
S. Ct. 2876 (1988) (emphasis added).
In the present case, Judge Sawaya, the trial judge,
followed the procedure mandated by the statute to determine the
legal sufficiency of the affidavit.

He ordered that a certified

copy of the affidavit be sent to Judge Wilkinson who, after
5
review, found it to be legally insufficient.
The statutory
procedures having been followed, Judge Wilkinson properly denied
defendant's recusal motion (T. 62). Because defendant has failed
to show actual bias or an abuse of discretion as required by

Judge Wilkinson's finding is supported by the record. The
record shows that contrary to defendant's claim, Judge Sawaya did
not refuse to answer or acknowledge defendant's pro se motions
and letters to the court. See defendant's pro se motions and
letters to the court regarding suppression of identification (R.
77-80, 93-94, 98-101, 109-14; addressed by Judge Sawaya at T. 311) and disqualification of Judge Sawaya (R. 115; addressed by
Judge Sawaya at T. 12, 62). Finally, defendant alleges that
Judge Sawaya refused to allow defendant to assist in his own
defense. At trial, Judge Sawaya asked defendant if he wanted to
represent himself (T. 11). Defendant responded that he would
like to assist in his defense (T. 11). Judge Sawaya then
explained to defendant that he would have to address the court
through his attorney (T. 13-14, 16, 721). This directive does
not amount to a denial of defendant's assistance in his own
defense.

Neeley, defendant is therefore not entitled to reversal on a
theory of judicial bias.
POINT V
DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE NOT
VIOLATED BY THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO
PRESERVE A PHOTO ARRAY.
Defendant claims his due process and fair trial rights
were violated because the police did not preserve a photo array
shown to the victim.

(Br. of App. at 32.)

Defendant does not,

however, claim that the photo array was deliberately destroyed to
suppress evidence.

State v. Stewartf 544 P.2d 477 (Utah 1975).

Defendant's claim must be rejected.
The standard for determining whether a criminal
conviction should be reversed for destruction of a photo array
was set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Nebeker, 657
P.2d 1359 (Utah 1983).

The court explained that where evidence

is destroyed/ the materiality required to reverse a conviction is
more than evidentiary materiality.

The Court reasoned as

follows:
"Fundamental to either duty [the duty to
preserve evidence or the duty to disclose it]
is the prerequisite that the evidence
destroyed, disposed of, or suppressed by the
prosecution was material in the
constitutional sense. The mere possibility
that an item of undisclosed evidence might
have helped the defense, or might have
affected the outcome of the trial, does not
establish "materiality" in the constitutional
sense. [Emphasis added.]"
Nebeker, 657 P.2d at 1363.

quoting State v. Hudspeth, 22 Wash.

App. 292, 593 P.2d 548 (1978); accord, United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97 (1976).

Later, in State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101, 106

-•*o.

(Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court clarified the burden to be
met before a conviction is reversed for destruction of evidence:
Constitutional materiality requires that
there be a showing that the suppressed or
destroyed evidence is vital to the issues of
whether the defendant is guilty of the charge
and whether there is a fundamental unfairness
that requires the Court to set aside the
defendant's conviction.
State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101, 106 (Utah 1985); quoting United
State v. Aqurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10 (1976).

Applying this

standard, this Court in State v. Jimenez, 761 P.2d 577, 579 (Utah
App. 1988), rejected a defendant's claim of reversible error
where the defendant failed to show that the destroyed evidence
was anything more than specutively material.
Analagous to the present case, both the Hudsputh and
Nebeker courts refused to reverse the defendants' convictions for
failure to preserve the photo arrays shown to the victims.

Both

courts held that the "defendant was not affirmatively identified
in the unpreserved array nor did the witnesses fail to identify
the defendant from an array in which defendant's photograph had
been specifically placed after the investigation focused on the
defendant."

Nebeker, 657 P.2d at 1363 (emphasis added).

See

also, Hudsputh, 593 P.2d at 550.
In the present case, the victim, Mr. Karmilian, was
shown two sets of photographs.

The first set consisted of

photographs shown to Mr. Karmilian on the day of the robbery (T.
140-1, 713, 718). Karmilian could not identify the robber from
these photographs.

Id.

Defendant's photograph was not included

in that array (T. 713, 722).
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When defendant and Webb were arrested two weeks later,
Detective Lomax showed Mr. Karmilian another set of photographs
which included both defendant's and Webb's photographs along with
five or six other photographs (T. 713, 722). Karmilian selected
one photograph and said there was a 50/50 chance that the
identified man was the robber (T. 140-41, 713, 722). At the
time, Detective Lomax was not sure which photo was defendant and
which was Webb, nor did he think Mr. Karmilian's 50/50
identification was significant enough for a positive
identification (T. 713, 719, 722). As a result, the photos were
not retained (T. . 719).
Defendant moved to suppress the identification evidence
prior to trial. After hearing arguments and testimony, the judge
denied the motion and ruled that he could not find that the
identification was tainted or influenced by the photo spread (T.
725-26).
Defendant claims that Mr. Karmillian's in-court
identification of defendant is suspect because the photo arrays
were not presented and because of the short time Mr. Karmilian
could have directly observed the robber.

(Br. of App. at 31.)

However, contrary to defendant's assertions, Mr. Karmilian
testified that he observed defendant as close as three feet and
at different times during the incident which lasted several
minutes (T. 85-86, 89-90, 102-06, 120, 125, 131-32, 138, 150-52).
Although defendant points out discrepancies between Mr.
Karmilian's description of the robber and defendant's physical
characteristics, the Utah Supreme Court held in Nebeker thatx

these are primarily matters of credibility of
the witness best left to the finders of fact.
. . . [T]he reliability of [the victim's]
identification is not necessarily impugned
because [his] initial description did not
match the defendant. [His] description of
the -assailant was generally consistent with
defendant's appearance, and it was the jury's
duty to resolve the reliability of the
testimony."
Nebeker, 657 P.2d at 1362. Officer Frank Hatton-Ward testified
that nothing in the descriptions given to him by Mr. Xarmilian or
Mr. Church were grossly different from defendant's physical
characteristics (T. 363).
Finally, it is important to note that defendant was
also positively identified in court by the security guard, Mr.
Church, who viewed the robber in the store at close range and who
was not shown any photos of defendant prior to trial (T. 182-90,
195-97, 202-04, 216). Accordingly, defendant has failed to show
more than a "mere possibility" that the prosecution's inability
to present the photo array was material in the constitutional
sense.
POINT VI
THE ISSUES RAISED IN DEFENDANT'S PRO SE
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ARE WITHOUT MERIT.
On August 4, 1989, defendant filed a pro se
Supplemental Brief of Appellant.

On September 5, 1989, this

Court granted defendant's Motion for Reconsideration to file the
supplemental brief.

Respondent was given until October 15, 1989

to file the respondent's brief.
In response to the supplemental brief, the State must
candidly admit that it is difficult to follow defendant's pro se

arguments.

In any event, the State will attempt to respond to

defendant's arguments in the order that they are raised in the
supplemental brief.
A.

GROUND ONE

In the section entitled "GROUND ONE," defendant raises
several issues regarding the testimony of Russell Martindale.
claims that:

He

(1) his trial should have been severed from Webb's

due to Martindale's incriminating testimony; (2) he was deprived
of discovery of Martindale's testimony; (3) the prosecutor
perjured himself in closing argument regarding Martindale's
testimony; (4) he was prejudiced by Webb's requested lesserincluded offense instruction; and (5) he was denied effective
assistance of counsel.
In response, the State notes that Russell Martindale
was called as a defense witness (T. 382). Thus, defendant cannot
claim prejudice by lack of discovery or failure to sever.
Neither can defendant succeed on his other claims without
specifying the claimed error and how he was prejudiced.

In that

the "burden of showing error is on the party who seeks to upset
the judgment," State v. Jonesf 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982),
the State should not be put to the task of developing defendant's
legal arguments just to conclude that they are meritless.
B.

GROUND TWO

In the section entitled "GROUND TWO," defendant claims
that inconsistencies existed in the description of the gun and
the robber.

He claims that the inconsistencies constituted the

knowing use of false testimony.

~?fi~

It is well-established that a conviction obtained by
the knowing use of perjured testimony will not be upheld if it is
shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that the perjury
could have affected the jury's verdict.

United States v. Agurs#

427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785 (Utah
1984).

However, it must be acknowledged that "[e]very lawyer,

indeed every intelligent layman, recognizes that minor
discrepancies may occur in statements made by one person at
different times."

State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 227 (Utah

1980) (emphasis added).

As noted in Point V of this brief, minor

discrepancies regarding the description of an assailant "are
primarily matters of credibility of the witness best left to the
finders of fact."

State v. Nebeker, 657 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Utah

1983).
In the present case, the descriptions of the robber
were not grossly different than defendant's physical
characteristics (T. 363). The shotgun was also identified as
similar to the one used in the robbery (T. 155, 189). In the
absence of evidence of knowing perjury, this Court should find
that it was the duty of the jury to resolve the reliability of
the identification evidence.
C.

GROUND THREE

In the section entitled "GROUND THREE," defendant
raises a variety of issues including:

(1) a conflict existed

between defendant and counsel; (2) description information was
improperly given to the victim; (3) defendant's refusal to
participate in a lineup; (4) bias on the part of the trial judge;

(5) denial of a speedy trial; (6) and the trial judge's denial of
defendant's request for a continuance of trial, appointment of
new counsel, and self-representation.
Many of these issues revolve around defendant's
suspicion that friends of the victim may have conveyed
description information about defendant to the victim.

At trial,

defendant expressed his dissatisfaction with his counsel's
efforts to investigate his suspicion (T. 2-14).

Counsel reported

that she had assigned an investigator to the matter and the
result was a statement by the victim that no one had spoken to
him regarding defendant's description (T. 5). When Judge Sawaya
asked defendant if he wanted his attorney dismissed, defendant
simply responded that he wanted a hearing to further investigate
any wrongdoing, but that he believed his counsel was a "good
lawyer" (T. 4). As it became apparent that defendant's motions
were an attempt to delay the trial, Judge Sawaya denied
defendant's motions to continue trial (T. 2-14).
It is abundantly clear from the record that defendant
was simply attempting to delay trial on any basis (T. 2-14).

No

actual conflict existed between defendant and his counsel.
Counsel had investigated defendant's suspicions and discovered
they were unfounded.

Thus, no constitutional deficiency in

counsel occurred by counsel's lack of interest in pursuing a
frivolous issue.

See generally, Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668 (1984); State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989).
Regarding defendant's claim surrounding his refusal to
consent to a lineup, the State cannot decipher the basis of

defendant's claim or how he was prejudiced.

Accordingly, no

response can be formulated.
Defendant's claim of judicial bias has been addressed
in Point IV of this brief and need not be restated.
Lastly, Judge Sawaya did not abuse his discretion in
denying defendant's motion for a continuance and appointment of
stand-by counsel which were made by defendant on the morning of
the jury trial.

Defendant's motions were only made for the

purpose of delay and were not soundly based.

See People v.

Moore, 47 Cal.3d 63, 252 Cal.Rptr. 494, 762 P.2d 1218, 1224-28
(S. Ct.), cert, denied, 109 S. Ct. 2442 (1989) (trial court
properly denied defendant's motion for substitute counsel, motion
to act as co-counsel status, and motion to proceed in propria
persona where defendant's motions were considered on the day of
trial, where defendant was unable to proceed to trial if motions
were granted, where defense counsel was ready to proceed, and
where out-of-state witnesses were present for trial).

Thus, no

reversible error resulted.
D.

GROUND FOUR

As "GROUND FOUR," defendant claims there are
inconsistencies between the testimony of Britt Martindale and
Russell Martindale.

Additionally, he claims prosecutorial

misconduct by the prosecutor's characterizations that no major
discrepancies existed between Britt and Russell's testimony and
that defendant pawned stolen jewelry in Las Vegas.
As discussed above, minor discrepancies in witness
testimony is a matter of reliability to be decided by the jury.

Nebeker, 657 P.2d at 1362. Further, a prosecutor is given wide
discretion in closing argument to discuss the evidence and
inferences which may be drawn therefrom.
Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973).

State v. Valdez, 30
Applying these legal

principles, this Court should find that the reliability of the
Martindales' testimony was properly considered by the jury and
the prosecutor's inference was fairly based on the evidence.
E.

GROUND FIVE

Defendant claims as "GROUND FIVE" that he was denied a
fair trial due to juror bias which was disclosed on voir dire.
In support of his claim, defendant notes that five (5) jurors
responded on voir dire that they were acquainted with persons in
law enforcement.

Defendant also cites the United States Supreme

Court case of Batson v. Kentuckyf 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Pursuant to Rule 18(e)(14) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a juror may be removed for cause if the
challenging party shows the following!
That a state of mind exists on the part of
the juror with reference to the case, or to
either party, which will prevent him from
acting impartially and without prejudice to
the substantial rights of the party
challenging. . . .
Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(14).

The selection of a fair and

Impartial jury falls within the sound discretion of the trial
court.

State v. Lacey# 665 P.2d 1311, 1312 (Utah 1983).

However, it is prejudicial error for the trial court "to compel a
party to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who
should have been excused for cause.*
22, 25 (Utah 1984).

State v. Hewitty 689 P.2d

In State v. Lacey, 665 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1983), the Utah
Supreme Court expressed that only "strong and deep impressions"
on the part of a prospective juror serve as a basis for
disqualification for cause.

Id. at 1312 (citing State v. Bailey,

605 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878)).

A juror is considered to have formed strong and deep

impressions if it is clear that the juror's mind is closed to
testimony in opposition to those impressions.
689 P.2d 22, 25 (Utah 1984).

State v. Hewitt,

However, "[t]he question of degree

of partiality (or "impressions") remains largely within the
discretion of the trial court." Lacey, at 1312 (footnote
omitted).
In the instant case, defendant did not challenge for
cause the jurors he now claims were biased.

In the absence of a

specific and timely challenge for cause, defendant has not
preserved the issue for appeal.

Terry v. Hopt, 3 Utah 396, 4 P.

250, rev'd on other grounds, 110 U.S. 574 (1884); State v.
Steggell, 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983).
In any event, the jurors responded that they could act
impartially and would not be influenced in any way by their
acquaintance with persons in law enforcement (T. 42). In the
absence of any record evidence of actual bias, defendant's claim
must be rejected.
P.

GROUND SIX

Defendant claims as "GROUND SIX" that the "consent to
search" form was not signed by Renee Gregerson and that the
police forged her signature on the form.

He points to the

testimony of Linda Knight, a certified graphanalysist, who
testified at a pretrial suppression hearing that the signature
was not Ms. Gregerson's (R. 349, pp. 15-35).

As legal support,

defendant cites the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Because defendant does not claim that consent was
involuntarily given, the State will limit its response to the
issue of whether Ms. Gregerson signed the consent to search form.
The issue of whether Gregerson signed the consent form was
essentially a question of fact to be decided by the trial judge
at the pretrial suppression hearing.

This Court will not set

aside a trial court's finding unless it is clearly erroneous.
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).

A finding is considered clearly erroneous

if it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the
appellate court is convinced, definitely and firmly, that a
mistake has been made.

State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786-87

(Utah 1988); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-93 (Utah 1987).
This Court must give due deference to the trial court's
determinations regarding the credibility of the witnesses and
conflicting testimony.

State v. Kelly, 770 P.2d 98 (Utah 1988);

State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1986).
Reviewing the evidence, the trial court's finding that
Gregerson signed the consent form is amply supported.

The

testimony established that a permission to search form was filled
out by the police and presented to Gregerson.

(See Addendum "B;"

Permission to Search Form.) Gregersen signed the form which was
also witnesses and signed by two police officers.

Id.

(T. 653,

670.) At the suppression hearing, Gregersen testified that she
simply could not remember signing the consent form (T. 697/ 704).
However, she admitted that the signature on the form looked like
hers (T. 704). Judge Sawaya found consent and denied defendant's
motion (R. 68).
At a re-newed suppression hearing, Gregerson denied
that the signature on the form was hers (R. 349, 41). Again, she
simply denied any memory of the form.

jld. at 39.

Defendant

offered the testimony of Linda Knight who opined that the
signature on the consent form was dissimilar to Gregersen's
signature (R. 349, pp. 14-35).

Judge Sawaya again found consent

and denied defendant's motion (R. 119).
Under the totality of the record evidence, it cannot be
said that Judge Sawaya's finding of consent is against the clear
weight of the evidence.

In light of the police officer's

testimony that Gregerson signed the form and Gregerson's curious
lack of memory. Judge Sawaya could reasonably believe the police
officers' testimony and reject Knight's opinion.

Accordingly,

this Court should find that Judge Sawaya did not abuse his
discretion in finding her consent to be voluntarily given.

_A?_

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, respondent requests this
Court to affirm defendant's conviction.
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1989.
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